argued that Wicksellʼs equilibrium conditions together did constitute a promising approach to monetary analysis. A few years later Bertil Ohlin ([1933] 1978) entered the discussions. It ended in 1941 when Tord Palander published a penetrating criticism of Myrdalʼs analysis. 3 When G. L. S. Shackle (1967) surveyed the main theoretical advances during the period 1926-39, he did not only discuss imperfect competition, ordinal utility theory, and Keynesian economics. He included monetary equilibrium as well. Monetary equilibrium has also been discussed as one aspect of the theories of the Stockholm school. See Thomas 1936; Ohlin 1937b Ohlin , 1937c Hansson 1982; Patinkin 1982; Dostaler 1990; Myhr man 1991; and Laidler 1999. Steiger 1987 offers a concise summary. See also Leijonhuf vud 1981, chapter 7; and Uhr 1960 .
The purpose of this paper is to give a general overview of the development of the concept of monetary equilibrium by focusing on the theoretical foundations of the discussion. Analytical issues will be more heavily stressed than in the previous literature. The following issues will be taken up:
• What information do the three equilibrium conditions give regarding the development of the economy? Are more equilibrium conditions needed? • Why did Wicksell formulate the fi rst equilibrium condition in terms of prices instead of in terms of quantities-that is, as equality between the natural and the loan rate of interest, indicating that the rate of interest should be normal? • The second equilibrium condition was formulated as equality between saving and investments. Did this mean that Wicksell formulated a loanable funds theory of interest rate determination? Moreover, what was the relationship between the loanable funds theory of Wicksellʼs Swedish followers and the Keynesian theory of liquidity preference? • Myrdal (1931) , Palander ([1941 Palander ([ ] 1953 , and Keynes (1973a) all stated that the rate of interest is a monetary phenomenon. What exactly did they mean by this and how was the argument related to the model of interest rate determination?
666 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) • In a general equilibrium model, the rate of interest operates simultaneously on different margins (for example, on investment decisions or fi nancial portfolio decisions). From this perspective the gap between the natural and the loan rate of interest may be due to the fact that markets are not cleared simultaneously (for example, they may be cleared sequentially, as in one of Wicksellʼs [1898, chap. 9B] models). Alternatively, as in Lindahlʼs (1930) analysis, some markets are cleared by prices and some are not, so that rationing restrictions are doing part of the job.
• Temporary equilibrium thus takes two forms: Walrasian temporary equilibrium and temporary equilibrium with rationing. To what extent did Wicksell and his Swedish followers perform their analysis with (generalized) equilibrium theory and to what extent did they perform disequilibrium analysis?
The discussion proceeds in the following order. I fi rst give an outline of the contributions of Wicksell, Lindahl, Myrdal, Ohlin, and Palander concerning monetary equilibrium. After that, I discuss a number of analytical issues: the choice of equilibrium conditions and the formulation of these in terms of prices or in terms of quantities; loanable funds versus liquidity preference theory; whether the rate of interest is a monetary phenomenon; different equilibrium models; and fi nally, the development of Swedish disequilibrium analysis. The paper ends with a conclusion.
Wicksellʼs Development of Monetary Theory
In the 1890s Wicksell had published a book in microeconomics and capital theory (1893) and a book on public fi nance (1896). He fi nally (1898) made a contribution to the theory of money. 4 The fi rst monetary contribution by Wicksell (1898) was an outline of a theory of demand for real balances. 5 The classical quantity theory of money could then in principle be formulated as an equilibrium condition: At a given quantity of nominal balances, the price level has to adjust so that demand and supply of real balances are equal. This is similar to an ordinary equilibrium condition on a goods market. The equilibrium condition is expressed in quantities, and the equilibrating variable is a price.
The discussion of the quantity theory in terms of supply and demand for money is clearer in Marshallʼs unpublished manuscript from (about) 1871; see Marshall [1871 ] 1975 and Laidler 1991 . 6 Wicksell probably did not know of this manuscript, but he had indirect knowledge of the reasoning through Marshallʼs (1926) memoranda and evidence before the Royal Commission on the values of gold and silver 1887-88. 7 In this long evidence, Marshall illuminated the consequences of introducing a bimetal standard based on gold and silver.
Wicksellʼs ([1898] 1936) refi nement of the classical quantity theory of money in the beginning of Interest and Prices was more like a footnote. His main concern was to give a theoretical answer to empirical observations, which seemed to contradict the quantity theory of money.
Ricardo ([1810] 1994) explained high prices by excess emission of bank notes by the Bank of England. Moreover, he predicted a low rate of interest in connection with price increases. Evidently Ricardo did not analyze only the direct effect on the demand for goods of increased money balances, but also the indirect effects via the loan market:
I do not dispute, that if the Bank were to bring a large additional sum of notes into the market, and offer them on loan, but that they would for a time affect the rate of interest. The same effects would follow from the discovery of a hidden treasure of gold or silver coin. If the amount were large, the Bank, or the owner of the treasure, might not be able to lend the notes or the money at four, nor perhaps, above three per cent.; but having done so, neither the notes, nor the money, would be retained unemployed by the borrowers; they would be sent into every market, and would every where raise the prices of commodities, till they were absorbed in the general circulation. It is only during the interval of the issues of the Bank, and their effect on prices, that we should be sensible of an abundance of money; interest would, during that interval, be under its natural level; but as soon as the additional sum of notes or of money became absorbed in the general circulation, the rate of interest would be as high, and new loans would be demanded with as much eagerness as before the additional issues. (Ricardo [1810 (Ricardo [ ] 1994 However, the empirical tests of the prediction indicated the opposite relationship. Based on a rich statistical material, Tooke (1844) draws the conclusion that changes of the price level lead to changes in the quantity of money.
8 This is in contrast to the causal direction according to the quantity theory of money. In addition, the empirical material indicated that periods of price increases coincided with a high rather than with a low loan rate of interest.
To tackle this problem, Wicksell assumed money partly in the form of deposits in the banks. This was not only in conformity with the development of the payments system during the nineteenth century. It also meant an endogenous nominal quantity of money.
In chapter 9, section B of Interest and Prices, Wicksell presented a simple model illustrating the central mechanisms for the case that the quantity of money is identical to deposits in the banking system. 9 He assumed that production demands time and takes exactly one "year." This means that the supply of goods in one year is determined by production during the previous year. In the beginning of the period (year), fi rms borrow to be able to pay for the original factors of production-labor and land. Factor prices are determined in the beginning of this period. The income of workers and landowners is used for buying consumer goods. Goods prices are consequently determined in this step. After that the production process goes on during the period. The same events are repeated period by period. If the natural rate of interest (in this case the rate of profi ts 10 ) equals the loan rate of interest, the system will be in stationary equilibrium.
11
Now assume that at a constant loan rate of interest, the natural rate of interest increases due to increased productivity. 12 At given factor inputs Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 669 8. "Equipped with an infi nite amount of practical experience and unhampered by any very great theoretical ballast, Tooke set out to fi ght the Ricardian theories and to prove that their conclusions in many cases did not tally with reality" (Wicksell [1899 (Wicksell [ ] 1958 .
9. Note that Wicksell himself did not include deposits in his defi nition of money. The matter is discussed below.
10. Profi ts including interest payments as a percentage of wage and rent payments. 11. This is not a complete description. Wicksell further assumed that capitalists partly deposit money in the banks; partly in the end of the period buy the results of the production process from the entrepreneurs. The capitalists-traders then sell the goods to the laborers and landowners in the beginning of the next period, just after the factor markets are equilibrated. It is consequently a rather complicated setup, but the complication is needed for the model to function in an appropriate way. Small changes of the setup will produce big differences in the working of the model (see Laidler 1991, 130-33) .
12. Consequently he studied changes in the relationship between the loan rate of interest and profi t possibilities when investing the borrowed money. Thornton ([1802] 1994) had already discussed this. But when Wicksell wrote his book he did not yet know of Thorntonʼs and goods prices, profi ts will then increase. This induces fi rms to attract factors of production, and consequently factor prices will increase. If the natural rate of interest increases by 1 percent, factor prices must increase by the same percentage in order for factor markets to equilibrate again. However, in the next moment pricing in the goods markets takes place. Since incomes have increased by 1 percent and since marginal propensity to save is zero, goods prices will increase by 1 percent as well. This is an equilibrium analysis since there is a successive equilibration of factor and goods markets in each period. However, it is not the question of a stationary equilibrium or even temporary equilibrium, since in the latter case all markets would simultaneously be in equilibrium. For a further discussion, see Siven 1997. Prices will increase as long as the gap between the natural rate of interest and the loan rate of interest is positive. The reason why price level increases in each period equal the gap between the two rates of interest has to do with assumptions concerning expectations-entrepreneurs expect the same price level as during the previous period. If price increases during a series of periods create expectations of further price increases, then the process will accelerate. Moreover, deposits (meaning means of payments) will increase at the same rate as prices do. Leaving out possible distributional effects between entrepreneurs-borrowers and capitalistslenders, there will be no counteracting real balance effect.
13
If the natural rate instead is lower than the loan rate of interest, the price level will fall. The model is symmetrical in its working.
By money Wicksell meant only coins, the quantity of which is exogenously determined by the central bank.
14 Consequently we can say that there is no money in Wicksellʼs basic model. There are only substitutes for money. These substitutes tend to increase the virtual elasticity of money. If the quantity of money in the limit case studied by Wicksell tends to Davidson 1916 and Uhr 1960, 200) .
13. This seems to contradict Patinkinʼs ([1956] 1965, 295-98) conclusion that the real balance effect may operate in a system of pure inside money. However, note Wicksellʼs assumption that the loan rate of interest is for this case fi xed by convention and that the supply of loans (and demand for deposits) is infi nitely elastic, whereas Patinkin assumed inside money to be exogenous (295). Another way of deriving a determinate price level with pure inside money is by assuming that the banks hold exogenously determined reserves (see Patinkin [1956 ] 1965 , 302-6, and Boianovsky 1998 zero, the velocity of transactions tends to infi nity. This is what Patinkin ([1956 Patinkin ([ ] 1965 , following Gurley and Shaw (1960) , called the case of "pure inside money." The other extreme case, the starting point of the quantity theory of money, can correspondingly be called "pure outside money."
15
Wicksellʼs simple model for the case of pure inside money is not capable of explaining Tookeʼs observation that the loan rate of interest depends positively on the price level. There are two possible ways to modify the model to account for the observation. The fi rst is to incorporate infl ationary expectations (see Fisher 1896) . If expectations are adaptive, price increases during one period induce expectations of a continuing infl ation, and consequently the nominal loan rate of interest will increase. 16 Wicksell ([1898] 1936, 166) did not oppose this argument, but he thought it was insuffi cient to explain infl ation processes since it did not explain what originally generates infl ation.
The second possibility, which was the one chosen by Wicksell, was to drop the assumption of pure inside money and further to assume that the banks try to keep a fraction of their lending in reserves.
17
A mechanism that explains why the banks set a higher loan rate of interest for a higher price level is that the public needs certain cash balances to effect their petty payments. The higher the price level, the bigger the required cash balances and the greater the leakage of bank reserves (inside drain). The banks then adjust by setting a higher loan rate of interest.
A mix of inside and outside money is thus suffi cient to explain the positive relationship between the rate of interest and the price level. But that explanation requires that disturbances most often come from the real, not from the monetary side, that the most frequent disturbances are autonomous changes of the natural rate of interest. If disturbances instead are dominated by monetary impulses, we get the case analyzed by Ricardo.
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15. Outside money is based on claims on the government or gold, whereas inside money is based on claims on private agents. While (leaving out public choice mechanisms) the quantity of outside money is exogenous, this does not hold for inside money. However, note Patinkinʼs ([1956] 1965, 295) assumption discussed above.
16. In this case the nominal loan rate of interest is no longer exogenous, but this may be the case for the real loan rate of interest.
17. However, despite his analysis of pure inside money, Wicksell never modeled the more complex case of mixed inside and outside money. This may be the reason why he did not arrive at a formulation that fully satisfi ed him and why he consequently changed his mind several times regarding the proper formulation of the theory of money. For an account of Wicksellʼs various positions in this regard, see Ohlin 1936. How are autonomous changes of the natural rate of interest generated? According to Böhm-Bawerk ([1889 ] 1959 , the natural rate of interest is an endogenous variable. This is even more clearly seen in Wicksellʼs (1893) generalization of the Austrian theory of capital, where he used a small stationary general equilibrium model with two factors of production and two goods.
18 A certain change of the natural rate of interest may thus have different possible causes. These causes may affect other endogenous variables in different ways. Consequently we cannot speak about unique effects of a change of an endogenous variable.
Wicksell (1898, chap. 9B) solved the problem in his pure model by making the natural rate of interest exogenous. A higher natural rate of interest is identifi ed with higher total productivity. That this can still represent an increased natural rate of interest is due to the distance in time between inputs and outputs. Wicksell assumed this distance to be constant, equal to one "year." But it is then impossible to determine the natural rate of interest.
19 In other places in his monetary writings, such as in Wicksell 1898, chap. 9A, he evidently thought of the natural rate of interest as determined within the framework of the Austrian theory of capital.
Up to now I have described Wicksellʼs monetary theory as it was presented in Interest and Prices. In 1906 the second volume of Wicksellʼs Lectures appeared. Here he made two changes to his earlier presentation. First he substituted the concept of normal rate for natural rate of interest. The normal rate of interest is, according to Wicksell ([1906 Wicksell ([ ] 1935 ; emphasis in original), "the rate of interest at which the demand for loan capital and the supply of savings exactly agree, and which more or less corresponds to the expected yield on the newly created capital, will then be the normal or natural real rate." This passage implies that the capital or loans market is equilibrated.
Second, Wicksell changed his mind regarding the role of the natural and the normal rate of interest as the key mechanism for generating changes of the price level. He now thought that increases in the quantity of gold (and consequently in the quantity of money) could lead to price 672 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 18. For a survey of how Wicksell developed the theory of capital, see Sandelin 1998. 19 . "Actually the period of production is not only very different in different branches of production, but in any given branch it is variable. It is, as we have seen, this very circumstance, combined with the possibility of transferring capital from one business to another, that is responsible for the determination under the conditions of free competition of the relative levels of real wages, or rents, and of the [natural] rate of interest itself " (Wicksell [1898 (Wicksell [ ] 1936 increases even without a positive gap between the normal (or natural) and the loan rate of interest.
20
In addition to the question of the proper condition(s) for monetary equilibrium, there was also the question of whether there could be a gap between the two rates of interest or if the equilibrium condition was always fulfi lled. Both questions relate to the choice of model representing the economy. Wicksellʼs follower Erik Lindahl investigated these questions. 21 and contrary to mechanical presentations of the quantity theory of money, Lindahl (1930, 121; 1939, 245) stressed that "changes of the price level as well as of relative prices should be explained by the relationship between demand and supply of goods." This means that the same sort of mechanisms should be used to explain monetary and "real" phenomena. Similar to Wicksell, Lindahl focused on inside money. Moreover, both Wicksell and Lindahl to some extent based the real part of their monetary analyses on microeconomic foundations in the form of capital theory formulated within general equilibrium models (see Wicksell [1893 ] 1970 and Lindahl [1929 ] 1939 . 22 The gap in Wicksellʼs theory between the natural rate and the loan rate of interest could be used as a simple indicator of the presence of monetary equilibrium. At zero expected rate of infl ation, a positive gap would mean infl ation, a negative gap defl ation. However Lindahl utilized neither the interest gap nor the normal rate of interest as analytical instruments.
Lindahlʼs Critique of Wicksellʼs Equilibrium Concept
Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 673 20. Wicksellʼs change of mind concerning the decisive role of the interest rate gap aroused a debate with Gustav Åkerman, who thought that Wicksellʼs original position was more accurate than his present (see Hammarskjöld [1944 ] 1955 and Siven 1998 Hammarskjöld [1944 ] 1955 , Selgin 1990 , Fregert 1991 , Siven 1998 , and Siven 2002 Consequently it was necessary for Lindahl, who built his monetary theory on the Wicksellian tradition, to explain why he did not utilize Wicksellʼs equilibrium conditions for monetary equilibrium. Lindahl identifi ed three such equilibrium conditions: 23 1. The normal loan rate of interest corresponds to the natural rate of interest. 2. The normal rate of interest is characterized by equilibrium between the supply of and the demand for saving (S = I ). 3. The normal rate of interest implies a constant price level.
A problem with the fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium (equality between the natural rate and the loan rate of interest) is, according to Lindahl (1930) , the lack of uniqueness of the two interest rates. First, the natural rate of interest will generally not be a unique number.
The natural rate of interest is one of the endogenous variables in the model describing a stationary economy. Since relative prices then are constant over time, the own rate of interest will be the same for all goods. In intertemporal and temporary equilibrium, relative prices may change period by period. This means that the own rate of interest may be different for different goods: 24 If, however, the situation is such that the real rate of interest in one branch of production is greater than in another, a stationary equilibrium is not conceivable. It must then be supposed, that the price of the former commodity gradually declines in relation to that of the latter until the real return in both lines of investment becomes equal. But we can then no longer speak of a real rate of interest, determined by purely technical conditions. (Lindahl [1930 (Lindahl [ ] 1939 In addition to the problem of identifying a unique natural rate of interest, differentiated loan rates of interest imply a further problem of defi ning the normal rate of interest. 25 The same effect on aggregate demand could 674 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 23. This is not Wicksellʼs own taxonomy. The three equilibrium conditions were put together by Lindahl ([1930 Lindahl ([ ] 1939 24. In temporary equilibrium, unlike in intertemporal equilibrium, expectations about (future) own rates of interest and relative price changes are not necessarily correct.
25. Lindahlʼs criticism of Wicksell thus concerns the level of aggregation. There is a parallel in von Misesʼs ([1912] 1971) discussion of pricing in different production stages. A lower loan rate of interest would, for example, lead to wrong relative prices in different stages of the production process and thus generate a cycle. According to von Mises, Wicksell did not catch be achieved with different interest rates; for example, a higher short-term rate could be balanced with a lower long-term rate.
26
Even if we put aside the problem of uniqueness of the natural and the loan rates of interest, there are further problems of speaking of a gap between the two rates. Can a gap exist?
When Lindahl ([1930 Lindahl ([ ] 1939 discussed the fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium, he pointed out that (putting aside the differentiation of loan interest rates), the loan rate and the real rate of interest would be equal in equilibrium. 27 The argument is that if the real rate is defi ned as profi tability, the price system will always adjust so that the two rates are equal. The same can be said if the real rate is uniquely determined by technical conditions.
The argument is built on the assumption of temporary equilibrium (of which intertemporal and stationary equilibrium are special cases). Then there will be simultaneous equilibrium in all markets, and the result will follow if in addition we assume perfect competition. Note that whereas Lindahl (1930) used the temporary equilibrium method, Wicksell (1898, chap. 9B) used sequential clearing of the factor and goods markets, not simultaneous clearing as in temporary equilibrium. In this case there may very well exist a gap between the natural and the loan rate of interest. The existence of a gap thus depends on the model. In other parts of his monetary works (for example, chapter 8 of Wicksell 1898) he might have thought of simultaneous clearing of all markets in the same period, but his exposition makes it impossible to be sure.
As to the second condition for monetary equilibrium (that the normal rate of interest is characterized by equilibrium between the supply of and the demand for saving), Lindahl ([1930 Lindahl ([ ] 1939 in principle agreed with Wicksell, but Lindahlʼs interpretation of saving and investment in the equilibrium condition was different from that of Wicksell. Lindahl ([1930] 1939, 249-50) stated, "The net demand for saving from producers during a certain period can be measured by that part of total net output Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 675 these effects because he did not analyze the production process in enough detail. For a comment, see Wicksell [1914] 1999. The discussion of von Mises was further developed in Hayek [1929 Hayek [ ] 1933 Hayek [ , [1932 1935. See also Bellofi ore 1998.
26. For a discussion, see Lindahl [1930 Lindahl [ ] 1939 . In the terminology of Wicksell and his contemporaries, the real rate here does not mean the nominal rate of interest minus the expected rate of infl ation. It means rather the rate of interest of the real sector of the economy, for example, the rate of interest in a stationary economy without money (the natural rate of interest), as in Wicksell 1893. which consists of an increase in capital equipment. Again, the net supply of saving in a certain period is the amount by which incomes of consumers exceed their consumption. . . . Equilibrium between the demand for and supply of saving evidently implies equilibrium in respect to the demand and supply of consumption goods during the period."
However, neutrality of the loan rate of interest (that is, the normal rate of interest) does not necessarily mean a constant price level. The third condition for monetary equilibrium should according to Lindahl ([1930] 1939, 252-57) be formulated so that the normal rate of interest is neutral with respect to expected changes of the price level. If expected infl ation increases by 2 percent, the normal rate of interest would increase by the same percentage.
It seems that the main difference between Wicksell and Lindahl is that they used different types of equilibrium analysis, not whether aggregation was permissible. Lindahlʼs main argument against the possibility of an interest gap was in his use of the temporary equilibrium method. It is precisely at this point that Myrdal (1931) was critical of Lindahlʼs discussion. Myrdal instead tried to accept Wicksellʼs starting points. Myrdal consequently aimed at an immanent criticism of Wicksellʼs analysis of monetary equilibrium.
Myrdalʼs Discussion of Monetary Equilibrium
The reason for Lindahl (1930) to discuss Wicksellʼs three conditions for monetary equilibrium was to explain why Lindahl did not use the concept of the normal rate of interest. Lindahlʼs treatment thus constituted only a minor part of his work on the means of monetary policy. In contrast, Myrdalʼs paper of 1931 and the following two versions of 1933 and 1939 were focused on the problem of monetary equilibrium. The 1931 version was published in Swedish, a longer version in German in 1933, and an English translation of the last in 1939-each with some content modifications from the previous one. In the following I will start from Myrdal 1931, and also comment on the revisions in the two later versions.
Contrary to Lindahl, Myrdal thought it was possible to use Wicksellʼs fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium in the analysis. Myrdal (1931, 193) was critical of Lindahl, who "tries to escape the whole conception of monetary equilibrium that Wicksell tried to construct through his theory of the ʻnaturalʼ or ʻnormalʼ rate of interest." Myrdal also thought that it would have been possible for Lindahl to dig deeper if he had preserved Wicksellʼs equilibrium construction. 28 Myrdal on the other hand stressed that monetary equilibrium should be viewed as an instrument for studying pricing situations that themselves do not need to represent equilibria: "It is clear that the determination of monetary equilibrium mainly is of indirect signifi cance since it poses the problem of adjustment between [equilibrium] states and gives structure to this dynamic problem" (195) . Furthermore, adjustment could not be studied through Lindahlʼs temporary equilibrium method. 29 Instead, according to Myrdal, a succession of nonequilibrium states should be studied. These situations should be characterized by the values of the variables included in the conditions for monetary equilibrium. 30 Furthermore, and in contrast to Lindahl (1930) , Myrdal (1931) did not think it was necessary to assume that the rest of the economy is in equilibrium when analyzing monetary equilibrium. So monetary equilibrium is characterized by its equilibrium conditions, not any other equilibrium conditions. Monetary equilibrium should, according to Myrdal, be seen as a reference situation. The absence of monetary equilibrium would create changes in the economy. These changes could be analyzed as tendencies Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 677 28. As a matter of fact Lindahl did use equilibrium analysis when studying monetary problems, but he did not utilize the equilibrium rate of interest (equality between the loan and the natural or normal rate of interest) as an analytical instrument, for reasons discussed in section 2.
29. Both Lindahl and Myrdal assumed that the equations describing the economic system were homogenous of degree zero in all prices. This means that if monetary equilibrium is disturbed, it will not be regained via a change of the price level. Price level changes will instead be boundless. To get fi nite price level changes, Lindahl (1930) assumed that relative prices change. He assumed wages to be sticky in comparison to other prices. The income distribution will thus change, and this change will restore monetary equilibrium. For example, a fall of the loan rate of interest will increase the price level more than the wage level, so that real wages will fall. Since the marginal propensity to consume is higher among wage earners than among entrepreneurs, demand for consumer goods will fall and monetary equilibrium will thus be reinstalled. However, relative prices will now be "wrong" so that there will not be a (Walrasian) temporary equilibrium any more. Consequently, the adjustment from one temporary equilibrium to another cannot be studied with the temporary equilibrium method. However, note the possibility of temporary equilibrium with rationing (see Grandmont 1982) . But even temporary equilibrium with rationing assumes extensive coordination via the expectations of the agents. It seems that Myrdal (1931) demanded analyses of situations where there was not even temporary equilibrium with rationing.
30. Myrdal (1931) did not to any appreciable extent live up to his promise to study disequilibrium situations. However, in the German edition of 1933 (427-31) and in the English edition of 1939 (116-22) there is some discussion of how discrepancies ex ante are resolved in equalities ex post.
in a point of time: that is, as changes in the economy in very short time intervals. Moreover, Myrdal suggested that these tendencies were not only valid for short intervals, but in addition gave a projection for the further development of the system. 31 Myrdal (1931, 196) stated the main problem of his paper in the following way: "Which conditions, under nonstationary conditions, should a pricing situation fulfi ll in order to be characterized a monetary equilibrium according to Wicksellʼs theory? Much would be gained if this question could be answered without assuming general equilibrium preceded by stationary conditions. This would not least be important for the application of theory to actual situations which cannot be characterized by how they divert from ʻceteris-paribus-stationaryʼ states." 32 Similar to Lindahl, Myrdal was critical of defi ning the natural rate of interest as a physical product. According to Myrdal, this presupposes either an economy with only one good that is also used as input in the production process; or alternatively, that the economy is in stationary equilibrium so that all relative prices are constant. It is evident that Myrdal thought the fi rst case was unrealistic, whereas the second case was an impasse, since relative prices then are constant and are simultaneously determined with the real rate of interest. Myrdal did not think that it is possible (or he believed that it is not meaningful) to compare stationary equilibria.
33
Was it possible to calculate such value productivity without money? Myrdal did not think so, his main argument being that "through borrowing and lending, the unit of account will make a real impact on relative prices; pricing will then also depend on changes of the exchange value of the monetary unit in comparison to different commodities. 34 However, 678 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 31. On this last point see the criticism by Palander in section 5 of this article. 32. Lindahlʼs temporary equilibrium implies general equilibrium in the current period (not necessarily intertemporal equilibrium). For convenience, Lindahl assumed that the economy originally was in stationary equilibrium. Lindahlʼs reason was presumably that the economy otherwise will endogenously change in time. This means that not only the disturbance (for example, a change of the loan rate of interest) will affect the development of the endogenous variables, but also the initial conditions. 33. Myrdal did not discuss the reason for this, but he might have thought that intertemporal equilibrium or some more general equilibrium or disequilibrium process must describe the trajectory from one stationary equilibrium to another. This is the argument used by Lindahl (1929) when he extended his analysis from stationary to intertemporal equilibrium.
34. Here Myrdal could mean at least two things. First, he could assume goods money so that one of the goods functions as a numeraire and means of transaction. In this case the value of money will be affected by the relative price. To calculate the natural rate of interest we have to take into account both the own rate of interest and the change of the relative price what Wicksell meant by his hypothesis of freedom from all monetary transactions is evidently to set aside monetary problems when determining the natural rate of interest" .
Myrdal consequently argued that the natural rate of interest should be conceived of as value productivity. This value productivity could be calculated as a rate of return on (new) real capital. 35 Return net of depreciation should be used in the numerator, and reproduction cost of capital in the denominator. 36 The fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium could then be formulated as equality between the natural rate as defi ned above and the loan rate of interest. 37 Myrdal then assumed the same profi tability for all fi rms. 38 In his discussion of the second condition for monetary equilibrium, Myrdal was critical of Lindahlʼs position that investment always equals saving, although the new equilibrium might be approached through a change in the price level. Lindahl consequently did not think that investment and saving were identically equal, but that the economy is always in temporary equilibrium. Disturbances change the values of the endogenous variables so that the different equilibrium conditions are always fulfi lled. Myrdal (1931, 228) actually was critical of Lindahlʼs assumption of temporary equilibrium. In temporary equilibrium, changes in the values of the endogenous variables occur in the transition from one period to another, whereas the values of all endogenous variables are constant during a period. At the end of the period the endogenous variables change anew, in spite of the fact that they were constant during the passed period. Myrdal thought that this discrete approximation of a continuous process was an unrealistic and unfruitful method. He instead suggested that one should study the tendencies in a point of time and the movement from one point of time to another. 36. Both net return and reproduction cost of capital are discounted to the planning moment.
37. The loan rate of interest could also be written as return net of depreciation divided by the capital value of the existing capital. Both net return and capital value are discounted to the planning moment.
38. For practical purposes, Myrdal (1931, 258) suggested that the condition could be rewritten as equality between the present value of existing real capital and the reproduction cost of this capital. The correspondence with Tobinʼs q is evident and has been noted by Andvig 1991. Myrdal moreover tried to prove that the second condition for monetary equilibrium follows from the fi rst, where both conditions were expressed according to Myrdalʼs formulation. However, his proof was faulty.
39
Unlike Wicksell, Myrdal did not interpret the equality of saving and investment as equilibrium in the capital market. Instead, "investments (or demand for saving) means real investments, that is, building of new capital, [whereas] saving is merely a part of income, the part which is not demanded for consumer goods" (Myrdal (1931, 213-14) . In order to be able to discriminate between investment and saving, "one must determine saving as a part of income, namely, the part that does not constitute demand for consumption goods" (214). For Myrdal the second equilibrium condition thus means equilibrium in the aggregate goods market, not in the loans market. As pointed out above, a similar reasoning can be found in Lindahl [1930 ] 1939 , 249-50. Myrdalʼs (1931 ; emphasis in original) explanation for his defi nition of saving was that the term sometimes had been defi ned as "released factors of production from production of consumer goods to production of real capital." According to Myrdal, such a defi nition of real saving is not possible to uphold if we want to separate it from real investment.
As to the third condition for monetary equilibrium (the normal rate of interest implies a constant price level), Myrdal fi rst stressed that any development of the price level (but not of relative prices) would be consistent with the fulfi llment of the fi rst two conditions. This can be explained by an assumption of pure inside money and that consequently all behavior equations will be homogenous of degree zero in the price level. 40 Moreover, the nominal rate of interest must constantly adjust to the level of infl ation (that is, expectations adjust instantly).
In spite of this, there will be a relationship between the fi rst two conditions and the third condition for monetary equilibrium. The reason is that changes in the price level will lead to changes in relative prices, since the degree of inertia varies between prices 41 and since outstanding contracts of various duration are fi xed in relation to previous price levels. 42 680 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 39. Lindahl (1939 , 262 n) and Palander ([1941 ] 1953 noted that Myrdalʼs proof was not correct. The second equilibrium condition was actually not derived from the fi rst one.
40. Note however that the citation above of Myrdal 1931, 198-99 , might be interpreted as if Myrdal assumed goods money.
41. Myrdal did not explicitly relate this discussion to Lindahlʼs assumption that wages are less fl exible than prices (see section 10 below).
42. Implicitly Myrdal here assumed that expectations at the dates of contract writing were centered on a stable price level.
Since the two fi rst conditions for monetary equilibrium presuppose certain relative prices, there is a connection between the fi rst two and the third condition for monetary equilibrium. Myrdal formulated it in the following way: "The ʻprice levelʼ which according to the two fi rst equilibrium conditions should be stabilized . . . can be calculated via an index. In this index the individual prices are weighted (1) with respect to their relative importance for the profi tability calculations of the fi rms, and after that (2) with respect to their specifi c inverted velocity of reaction" (238).
Myrdal pointed out that this principle could be applied to the old controversy between David Davidson and Knut Wicksell (241) . Their concern was whether monetary policy should always try to stabilize the price level (Wicksell) or if in addition, the price level should vary inversely to productivity changes (Davidson) . Myrdal drew the conclusion that Davidson was right only to the extent that wages were rigid in comparison to prices. If prices were less fl exible than wages, Wicksellʼs rule would hold.
Almost in parallel with the Swedish version of his work on monetary equilibrium, Myrdal wrote a longer version, which was to be published in German. 43 Myrdalʼs longer version was translated by his friend Gerhard Mackenroth, who originated the terms ex ante and ex post, 44 which consequently fi rst appeared in Myrdal 1933. However, the thoughts behind these terms are quite explicit in Myrdal 1931 . Moreover, Myrdal (1933 discussed how differences between savings (S) and investment (I) ex ante are resolved ex post. This is done (1) through changed revenues and costs and (2) through investment gains resulting from differences between anticipated and realized production costs of real capital.
The German version was later translated into English and appears as Myrdal 1939. The main difference from the German edition is that Myrdal now has deleted the "proof" that the fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium implies the second.
In sum, Myrdal was critical of Lindahlʼs use of the (temporary) equilibrium method and instead suggested disequilibrium analysis. Myrdal furthermore thought that Wicksellʼs criteria for monetary equilibrium could be reformulated as aggregated conditions. Myrdalʼs exposition was rich in ideas, but these were not always worked through. Tord Palander pointed this out in his penetrating discussion of Myrdalʼs analysis. Before discussing Palander 1941 , Ohlinʼs (1933 analysis of the second condition of monetary equilibrium and his comments about Myrdal 1931 and will be discussed.
Ohlin on Monetary Equilibrium
Bertil Ohlinʼs paper from 1933 (translated into English: Ohlin [1933 Ohlin [ ] 1978 was not principally a contribution to the neo-Wicksellian debate about monetary equilibrium. At the time Ohlin wrote his paper, the unemployment problem had become increasingly important. The Great Depression reached Sweden in 1930, and Ohlin participated on the Swedish unemployment commission. Ohlinʼs paper can be seen as a preparatory study to his grand book of 1934, 45 which essentially contains a discussion of monetary policy within the framework of Keynesian analysis of the type studied by undergraduates during the 1950s and 1960s. 46 Here Ohlin did not discuss only quantitative reactions (multiplier effects) of the economy to different disturbances, but also the accompanying price changes. Ohlin 1933 contains a starting point for such analysis. Ohlin ([1933 Ohlin ([ ] 1978 had started from S = I. He proceeded by adding consumption as well as inventory changes to both sides of the equation. Through this transformation Ohlin saw the second condition for monetary equilibrium as an equilibrium condition for the aggregate goods market.
47
In addition to this analysis, Ohlin 1933 contains valuable comments on Myrdalʼs discussion of monetary equilibrium. First of all, Ohlin stressed the importance of backward-looking expectations. Expectations are generated by the actually experienced development. Second, like Lindahl he was skeptical about a study of the normal rate of interest when studying dynamic processes. Third, Ohlin was skeptical of Myrdalʼs price index in his discussion of the third condition for monetary equilibrium. Ohlin thought that it would be impossible to get the necessary information for calculating this index. It was not operational. :4 (2006) 45. Wadensjö (1991) discusses Ohlinʼs work in the unemployment commission and the relationship between his paper of 1933 and the book of 1934.
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46. In addition, Myrdal 1934, part 4, chapters 3-4, contains macroeconomic analysis anticipating the income analysis of the General Theory. For further discussion, see Hansen 1981. 47. The extent to which Ohlin 1933 anticipated Keynes 1936 is discussed by Landgren 1960 , Steiger 1971 , Brems 1978 , Patinkin 1978 , Steiger 1978 , Yohe 1978 , Hansen 1981 , and Patinkin 1982 . One of the main questions is whether Ohlin (1933 Ohlin ( , 1934 assumed national income to clear the gap between investments and saving.
Palanderʼs Critique of Myrdalʼs Monetary Equilibrium
Palander 1941 contains an extensive analysis of the English translation of Myrdalʼs (1939) exposition of monetary equilibrium. Here Palander discussed Myrdalʼs period concept, his discussion of the cumulative process, and his treatment of the three conditions for monetary equilibrium.
Myrdal concentrated his analysis on "tendencies in a point of time." However, Palander thought that the fl ow concepts used by Myrdal, such as income or saving, demanded a time period of fi nite length. Planning may be done at a point of time, but the process must be followed at least during one period. The length of this period must, according to Palander, be so short that no plans reach fulfi llment and that consequently new planning will be required later in the same period. 48 On the other hand, the period must be long enough so that the results of the plans emerge within the period. Otherwise the development must be followed through several periods. Palanderʼs conclusion was that Myrdalʼs analysis, to be meaningful, at least must be seen as a one-period analysis, not an analysis of tendencies in a point of time. Moreover, the process should preferably be studied over a time span covering several periods. This argument can be applied to the cumulative process.
Myrdal did not give a strict defi nition of the cumulative process. In Wicksellʼs case it was evident that the development of the price level was studied. In Myrdalʼs case this was not so clear, since at least some prices were assumed to be sticky. Both for the case that Myrdal thought of a process in quantities (which was Palanderʼs interpretation) and for the case of a process in prices, the development of the variables had to be monotonous to be of a cumulative character. However, according to Palander, we cannot simply state that a process is cumulative without investigating the process over a series of periods. Certain initial conditions must be fulfi lled, and a certain form of the expectations-generating function is required for the process to be cumulative and not, for example, oscillatory.
49 These requirements were not discussed by Myrdal.
The fi rst equilibrium condition, equality between the natural and the loan rates of interest, was Wicksellʼs original equilibrium condition, already worked out in Interest and Prices. Like Myrdal, Palander ([1941] Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 683 48. Wicksellʼs "year" referred to above evidently does not fulfi ll Palanderʼs requirements of a "period."
49. Note, for example, Lundbergʼs (1937, chap. 9) discussion of how an economic expansion may be broken.
1953, 22) was critical of comparing the two rates of interest, one being a real and the other a monetary phenomenon:
A concept which is used for a monetary economy cannot be given a defi nition which makes it necessary to disregard the existence of money. Neither can the "real" rate be thought of as a simple expression for the current physical marginal productivity in a certain position. This can be determined only in the special case where there is a single factor of production and a single product of the same sort as the factor of production. The yield of an investment must therefore be defi ned as the ratio of its annual return to the amount invested, both measured in money.
In order to avoid the problem indicated above, Myrdal had worked with transformed variables: the capital value of existing capital and the production cost of new capital, respectively. Both were calculated at current and future (loan) interest rates. The gap between the two, the investment gain, gives, by way of the investment elasticity, actual investments. 50 Palanderʼs commentary was that if we are interested in investment behavior, marginal values, not average values, should be used. 51 Furthermore, the introduction of the investment elasticity gives only a circular derivation of investments, since this elasticity presupposes that investments are already known. Instead, an investment function should be used. Like Ohlin (1933) , Palander stressed that the fact that investments are profi table does not necessarily mean that they will be realized at once. There could be a later point of time when investments are even more profi table.
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In Myrdal 1939 , the proof that the fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium implies the second one was dropped. Palander discussed this proof and argued that the fi rst equilibrium condition was not even used in deriving the second one.
Is it always meaningful to speak of S = I ex ante as an equilibrium condition (the second equilibrium condition)? Here Palander noted that even if the agents have the same expectations, these expectations may be wrong. An example is that the agents have the same but faulty expectations of the production function, and therefore equality between saving 684 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 50. The fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium could then be stated as equality between production costs of new investments and capital value of existing capital.
51. The same comment was made by Shackle (1967, 114) . 52. This means that Ohlin in 1933 and Palander in 1941 had a rudimentary discussion of the option value of physical investments. For a modern development of this theory, see Dixit and Pindyck 1994. and investments ex ante is not a guarantee for temporary equilibrium. It is not even possible always to speak about investments and saving ex ante since expectations may be probabilistic. 53 In this case agents must have contingent plans for their actions. 54 Plans contingent on probabilistic realizations of events in turn rule out single-valued ex ante values of the planned quantities. If the plans of households and fi rms are not consistent with each other, the fl exible contingent plans adjust to the fi xed plans. For example, if prices are fi xed, then quantities will adjust.
Palander ([1941] 1953, 36-37) suggested that in order to speak about a determinate saving ex ante it is necessary to assume that some facts are fi xed in advance. One possibility is that the consumers, with certainty, correctly expect certain prices to rule during the coming period. According to Palander this means that Myrdal used the same period concept as the one used by Lindahl. 55 However, it does not necessarily mean that Myrdal, like Lindahl, used the temporary equilibrium method. Surprises may very well occur during the period.
Asssume that we can speak of single-valued saving and investments ex ante. What will then happen if the equality condition is not fulfi lled? Palander assumed that prices were fi xed within the period 56 and that the demand side will determine quantities. 57 Palander thought that the impact would be alterations of stocks of consumption goods, raw materials, and investment goods, and of unexpected changes in incomes.
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According to Palander ([1941] 1953, 44) different reasons for an ex ante discrepancy between saving and investments can lead to different Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 685 53. Absence of temporary equilibrium could then be due to probabilistic expectations concerning the current period, subjectively certain expectations that are different for different agents, or fi nally subjectively certain expectations that are the same for all agents but inconsistent with external conditions. 54. See Svennilson 1938 for an extensive treatment of this problem. 55. Myrdal (1931, 228) criticized Lindahlʼs method of breaking up periods into two parts. In the fi rst part, which has the time measure zero, all decisions are made: for example, all prices fi xed. In the second part, prices are constant and the development proceeds according to the plans made in the beginning of the period.
56. Palander ([1941 Palander ([ ] 1953 thought that Lindahl and Myrdal made the same assumption. However, it should be noted that Lindahlʼs assumption of temporary equilibrium means that the agents know the (equilibrium) prices when they plan their actions in the beginning of the period. Prices are then fi xed during the period.
57. This of course presupposes effective excess supply. His reading of Keynes may in this case have infl uenced Palander. Palanderʼs interest in the Keynesian theory is witnessed by his extensive survey (see Palander 1942) .
58. In contrast, Myrdal (1939, 39) thought that revenue or investment gains or losses would be the result. developments in future periods. 59 The development will also depend on how fl exible prices are. Palander thought that the Stockholm schoolʼs main assumption was infl exible prices.
Palander discussed what would happen if the plans of the buyers were more pessimistic than the plans of the sellers (45). This would lead to a cumulative process in the downward direction. However, relatively optimistic plans by the sellers could lead to increased demand for factors of production and thereby have an expansionary effect. This argument points to the necessity of having additional equilibrium conditions concerning other markets than the goods market, as has been stressed by Hansen (1951) (see section 6 below).
As to the third equilibrium condition, Myrdal thought that the fi rst two equilibrium conditions were the important ones. Myrdal (1939, 132 ) even thought that the price level had no role in equilibrating the goods market. However, Palander ([1941] 1953, 50 n) pointed out that given a nominal rate of interest, an expected change in the price level will affect the real rate of interest and thereby investments. 60 Palanderʼs argument is essentially the same as Lindahlʼs concerning the third equilibrium condition.
Myrdal thought that due to varying degrees of price infl exibility, relative prices would change in parallel to a change in the price level. And relative price changes may have real effects. But in order for monetary policy not to distort relative prices, Myrdal suggested that the policy should be adapted to the least fl exible prices. More specifi cally, Myrdal suggested that an index should be stabilized where prices are fi rst weighted with respect to their respective infl exibility and then with respect to their importance for profi tability and consequently on investments.
Palander noted a number of problems with Myrdalʼs index. How, for example, should the two weight systems be combined into one unique measure? 61 Palander further observed that the index did not take expectations into account, in spite of the fact that this was one of the main declared tasks for Myrdalʼs monetary study.
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59. Note the parallel to Hansenʼs ([1955] 1967) discussion of why it is impossible to speak about the effects of the budget defi cit; we can talk only about the effects of changes of exogenous, not of endogenous, variables.
60. Wicksell and members of the Stockholm school often used the real rate of interest as a synonym for the natural rate of interest. Here it is used in Fisherʼs (1896) way, as the nominal rate of interest minus the (expected) rate of infl ation.
61. For a comment, see Hansen 1951, 228 n. Palanderʼs critique was foremost directed at Myrdalʼs suggestions of forming a dynamic analysis. The critique was constructive, but it did not lead to a further discussion in Sweden. One reason was that it was published in 1941, when Swedish economists had other things on their minds. 62 Another reason was that the Swedish discussion of monetary equilibrium actually was the fi rst phase in the development of the Stockholm school. In the second phase, Swedish economists studied business cycle theory and stabilization policy within the framework of the unemployment commission. In the third phase, two young members of the Stockholm school published outstanding analytical theses (Lundberg 1937 and Svennilson 1938) . The problem of monetary equilibrium was consequently not a central issue at the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s. Moreover, by 1940 the Keynesian revolution was already under way.
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Palanderʼs contribution consequently ends the chronological survey. Below, a number of analytical issues will get a deeper treatment. I start with the choice of equilibrium conditions.
The Choice of Equilibrium Conditions
In a Walrasian general equilibrium model, we would ordinarily expect one equilibrium condition for each market. The number of independent equilibrium conditions will, via Walrasʼs law, be one fewer than the total number of markets. Why were there three conditions for monetary equilibrium, and why the particular ones?
Wicksell thought that the general price level was moved by forces analogous to those affecting relative prices. This means that relative prices respond to excess demands in different markets, whereas the general price level moves according to excess demand in the aggregate goods market. Leaving out infl ationary expectations, the third condition for monetary equilibrium would thus refl ect an equilibrium condition for the aggregate goods market:
Every rise or fall in the price of a particular commodity presupposes a disturbance of the equilibrium between the supply of and the demand for that commodity, whether the disturbance has actually taken place or is merely prospective. What is true in this respect of each commodity Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 687 62. World War II was then in its third year, and most Swedish economists were engaged in issues other than monetary theory.
63. For further discussion, see Jonung 1991. separately must doubtless be true of all commodities collectively. A general rise in prices is therefore only conceivable on the supposition that the general demand has for some reason become, or is expected to become, greater than the supply. (Wicksell [1906] 1935, 159; emphasis in original)
The question is then why we need two more equilibrium conditions. One possible answer is that an increasing price level is a mere refl ection of forces of a more fundamental nature. For example, infl ation might according to the quantity theory be due to a growing money supply; or according to Wicksellʼs cumulative process to a positive gap between the natural and the loan rate of interest. A stable price level (and equilibrium in the aggregate goods market) is consequently an effect of the fulfi llment of other equilibrium conditions.
The fi rst equilibrium condition, equality between the natural and the loan rates of interest, is the equilibrium used in Interest and Prices. The condition is especially important for the case of pure inside money. If this condition is fulfi lled, no cumulative process will be going on.
The second condition for monetary equilibrium (that the normal rate of interest is characterized by an equilibrium between the supply of and the demand for savings) implies, according to Wicksell, clearing of the loans market. This is in contrast to Lindahl, Myrdal, and Ohlin, who interpreted the second condition as an equilibrium condition for the aggregate goods market.
64
Neither Lindahl nor Myrdal discussed the possible difference between their and Wicksellʼs interpretation of the second condition for monetary equilibrium. 65 The reason might be that they did not think the difference was decisive in Wicksellʼs theory. For example, if Wicksell thought that the capital market was a mere refl ection of the aggregate goods market, equilibrium in one of the markets would by defi nition imply equilibrium in the other. In a three-market world with money as the third good, this would imply Sayʼs law with the excess demand for money identically equal to zero.
However, explicitly or implicitly, Wicksell repeatedly denied the validity of Sayʼs law. One example is his discussion in Interest and Prices of the real balance effect (Wicksell [1898 (Wicksell [ ] 1936 . Another example is Wicksellʼs ([1906] 1935, 159-60) explicit denial of Sayʼs law conceived as an identity. The exception is the case of pure inside money. Here the supply of money in the form of bank deposits passively adjusts to demand.
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The "money" market is thus always equilibrated in this case. The discussion will be taken up again below in connection with loanable funds versus liquidity preference theory. Myrdal (1931) thought that the second equilibrium condition could be derived from the fi rst one, but apart from partial equilibrium theory we would not expect equilibrium in a market to depend only on one price, in this case the loan rate of interest.
However, if one price (the loan rate of interest) is exogenous and all other prices do their job to equilibrate the markets, the level of this price would be decisive for equilibrium. One example of this is Lindahlʼs (1930) temporary equilibrium analysis. Here all markets are equilibrated provided the loan rate of interest is set at the right level.
67 Myrdal (1931) was critical of the temporary equilibrium method and wanted to use the conditions for monetary equilibrium as an analytical instrument even in situations outside equilibrium. However, this means that we do not have a very well-defi ned situation. For example, what would be the result if the aggregate goods market is in equilibrium while there is excess demand in the aggregate labor market? This was a situation that Wicksell ([1898] 1936, chap. 9B) analyzed, and his conclusion was that this situation could not be permanent. An increased wage rate would in the next moment eliminate excess demand in the labor market but create excess demand in the goods market.
A similar situation was treated by Hansen (1951, chap. 7) in his analysis of open (as opposed to repressed) infl ation. Hansen used a small macroeconomic model with one aggregate labor market and one aggregate goods market. The two excess-demand functions were assumed to be homogenous of degree zero in all prices. 68 The time derivative of the wage level is a positive function of the excess demand for labor, and the time derivative, Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 689 66. Note that Wicksell himself would call bank deposits substitutes for money. According to his terminology, the quantity of money is zero in this case.
67. I disregard differentiation of interest rates. 68. Hansen (1951, 171) pointed out two possibilities for the demand curve to directly or indirectly depend on the price level. The fi rst was the Pigou effect (the real balance effect). The second possibility works via the rate of interest. An increased price level implies a higher nominal transactions volume. At a given nominal quantity of money, the loan rate of interest has to increase in order to preserve equilibrium in the money market. However, Hansen left out these effects in his analysis. of the price level is a positive function of excess demand for goods. In quasi equilibrium there is excess demand for both goods and labor and consequently infl ation, but the real wage rate is constant. The rates of wage and price infl ation balance. In such a model a removal of the excess demand for goods by a shift of the demand curve will not eliminate infl ation as long as there is excess demand for labor. The parallel with Wicksellʼs analysis is evident.
If we interpret, as Ohlin (1933) did, the second condition for monetary equilibrium as zero excess demand in the aggregate goods market, it is evident that cumulative price increases will not be precluded. What will happen in the future depends on the state in other markets, for example the aggregate labor market. This is an exemplifi cation of a situation where monetary equilibrium according to Myrdal (1931) does not preclude the development of a cumulative process.
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The conclusion is that except in a dichotomized model, we cannot single out a few equilibrium conditions and hope that their fulfi llment guarantees stability, for example, with respect to the price level. The number of equilibrium conditions of course depends on the model. A highly aggregated model needs only a few equilibrium conditions. In order to precisely discuss the requirements of monetary stability, we need an explicit model. This was not provided by Myrdal.
Equilibrium Conditions in Prices and Equilibrium Conditions in Quantities
The fi rst condition for monetary equilibrium is formulated in terms of prices (interest rates), whereas the second is formulated in terms of quantities. In this section, I give a background to why Wicksell formulated the fi rst equilibrium condition in a rather unusual way.
An equilibrium condition can be formulated either in terms of quantities or in terms of prices. Walras analyzed market clearing from the point of view of the quantity demanded and supplied, respectively, at a certain price. In contrast Marshall often used the demand price and the supply price at a certain quantity. 70 However, when Marshall ([1871] 1975) discussed the quantity theory of money, he formulated the theory in terms of supply and demand for money-that is, in terms of quantities. When 690 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 69. As noted by Hansen (1951, 238) , the argument is parallel to Palanderʼs (1941) criticism of Myrdalʼs notion of monetary equilibrium (see the discussion in section 5 above).
70. See, for example, Marshall [1890] 1961, 142. Wick sell turned from pure outside money to the case of pure inside money, he formulated the equilibrium condition in terms of (relative) prices; the natural or normal rate of interest should equal the loan rate of interest.
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There is at least one instance when behavior cannot be analyzed in quantities, but must be analyzed in terms of prices: perfect competition with constant returns to scale. In this case the supply of the individual fi rm is indeterminate, and equilibrium is characterized by price being equal to average cost. The market supply curve is then horizontal, and the market quantity is given by the demand curve. Wicksell (1893) had himself analyzed this case.
In the above microeconomic example, the elasticity of the demand curve for the product of the individual fi rm and the elasticity of the marginal cost curve, respectively, are both infi nite. The parallel to monetary economics is pure inside money. Here the supply of bank money (demand for deposits of the banks = supply of loans of the banks) is infi nitely elastic at the given loan rate of interest. Moreover, the demand for bank money (supply of deposits by the public = demand for loans by the public) is infi nitely elastic at the given natural rate of interest, provided the natural rate is exogenous. The equilibrium condition can consequently not be formulated in terms of quantities, but must instead be formulated in terms of prices, that is, equality between the natural and the loan rate of interest. In this case the quantity of bank money and the price level rest in indifferent equilibria, provided that the loan rate of interest equals the natural rate (see Wicksell [1906 Wicksell [ ] 1935 .
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If one of the relationships is of infi nite elasticity but not the other, the fi rst one determines the price and the second one the quantity. In the case of mixed inside and outside money, the loan rate of interest will be a negative function of the quantity of outside money. Alternatively, we could assume pure inside money but an endogenously determined natural rate of interest, for instance by Austrian capital theory. 73 Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 691 71 . A more precise terminology would say that the loan rate of interest should be the normal rate of interest.
72. The reason why the price level is determinate, after all, is that it is given by the price level of the previous period.
73. In Wicksell 1898, chapter 9B, the natural rate of interest is exogenous. In other places he treated it as endogenous. According to Wicksell, a greater capital stock would mean a smaller natural rate of interest. Examples are in Wicksell [1898 Wicksell [ ] 1936 1903, 505; 1909, 64; and [1906] 1935, 205 . This was long before the debate on macroeconomic production functions with aggregate capital as a factor of production. For surveys, see Harcourt 1969 , Blaug 1974 , and Cohen and Harcourt 2003 As soon as either the supply of or the demand for bank money is no longer of infi nite elasticity with respect to the loan rate of interest, the price level is no longer indeterminate. Evidently this condition requires either mixed inside and outside money or an endogenous natural rate of interest.
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Loanable Funds versus Liquidity Preference Theory
As discussed above, Wicksell on one hand and Lindahl, Myrdal, and Ohlin on the other hand interpreted the second equilibrium condition differently. Wicksell thought of equilibrium in the loans market, whereas Lindahl, Myrdal, and Ohlin had some kind of goods-market equilibrium in their minds. The case is most clear for Ohlin, who explicitly thought about the aggregate goods market. Two questions immediately pose themselves: (1) Did Wicksell develop the second condition for monetary equilibrium into a theory of interest rate determination? (2) If Wicksellʼs followers did not conceive of the second equilibrium condition as referring to the loan market, did they construct a supplementary theory of interest rate determination?
As to the fi rst question, Wicksell had some discussion in Interest and Prices of the determination of the loan rate of interest. As discussed above, he thought that a rising price level via internal drain would increase the loan rate of interest. This is a reaction of the banks to a decreased monetary base. In this way the loan rate is adjusted to the normal rate of interest via price level changes. This is evidently not a loanable funds theory of the determination of the loan rate of interest.
As to the second question, neither Lindahl 75 nor Myrdal explicitly discussed the loan market(s). However, Ohlin (1937b Ohlin ( , 1937c in his famous papers, where he introduced the Stockholm school to an international audience, discussed Keynesʼs liquidity preference theory as opposed to the Swedish loanable funds approach. Ohlin (1937c, 221) fi rst declared that "the rate of interest is simply the price of credit, and that it is there-74. Including the case of pure outside money. 75. Lindahlʼs (1930) main objective was to analyze the effects on the price level of the interest rates set by the central bank. However, there was an instance when the central bank must follow a purely passive interest rate policy. This is the case of intertemporal equilibrium, when interest rates have to adjust to the expected development of the price level (see Siven 2002). fore governed by the supply of and the demand for credit. . . . Does this mean that its height has no connection with the disposition of individuals and fi rms to save and with other elements in the price system? Of course not. But it has such a connection only indirectly." Secondly, after mentioning Keynesʼs liquidity preference, Ohlin (1937c, 225 ; emphasis in original) stated:
A similar kind of reasoning can, of course, be applied gross, i.e. including the old claims which were outstanding when the period began. Peopleʼs willingness to hold the different claims and other kinds of assets every day governs the supply of credit. The total supply of claims, etc., governs the demand for credit. In each market for different claims, etc., supply and demand are made equal by price. These prices for interest-bearing claims on certain fi xed sums determine the rates of interest. It is quite obvious that this reasoning in gross terms leads to the same result as the net analysis above.
Interest rates are, according to Ohlin, consequently determined in the markets for claims. However, the pricing in the claims market(s) interacts with the pricing in other markets. The analysis can moreover be pursued in net terms, in terms of fl ow supply of and fl ow demand for claims, given the stock of outstanding claims in the beginning of the period. Equivalently, the analysis can be pursued in gross terms of supply of and demand for stocks of claims at the end of the period.
76 Ohlin (1937c, 226) did not think that net demand for interest-bearing claims was a mere mirror of the gap between investment and saving: "There is a third kind of purchases to be explained-namely, ʻfi nancial investment,ʼ i.e. the purchases of bonds, shares and bank deposits and the failure to use savings either for real or for fi nancial investment, which is identical with an increase in cash." Keynes (1937a, 241 ; emphasis in original) commented upon Ohlinʼs discussion of the determination of interest rates in the following way:
The liquidity-preference theory of the rate of interest which I have set forth in my General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money makes the rate of interest to depend on the present supply of money and the demand schedule for a present claim on money in terms of a deferred claim on money. . . . The alternative theory held, I gather, by Prof. Ohlin Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 693 76. For discussions of the stock fl ow problem in connection with the debate about liquidity preference and loanable funds, see Fellner and Somers 1941 , 1949 , 1950 Lerner 1944; Klein 1950a Klein , 1950b Tsiang 1956; and Patinkin 1958. and his group of Swedish economists, by Mr. Robertson and Mr. Hicks, and probably by many others, makes it to depend, put briefl y, on the demand and supply of credit or, alternatively (meaning the same thing), of loans, at different rates of interest. . . . the theories are, I believe, radically opposed to one another. Keynes (1937a, 244 ; emphasis in original) moreover suggested that Ohlinʼs argument implied that "the net supply of credit, thus defi ned, is exactly the same thing as the quantity of saving; . . . the net demand for credit at different rates of interest is exactly the same thing as the quantity of net investment at different rates of interest." Keynes consequently did not notice Ohlinʼs 1937c, 226, discussion.
In his reply, Ohlin (1937a, 425) stressed "that the relation between the curves referring to savings and investment and those referring to credit is close should be obvious. [But they are not identical:] It is possible to plan to save and to increase the quantity of cash instead of lending. Also one can plan to extend new credits in excess of planned savings, if one is willing to reduce oneʼs own quantity of cash. . . . Similarly with the planned demand for credit, which may differ from planned new investment owing to a desire to vary the cash held, to cover expected losses or to fi nance consumption." Ohlin (1937a, 426 ) also stressed the equivalence between Keynesʼs theory of liquidity preference and the loanable funds theory: "The theory I advance does not dispute that the rate of interest ʻequalises the advantages of holding actual cash and a deferred claim on cashʼ (Keynes, p. 245) . There is no contradiction between that statement and the view that the rate of interest is the price of credit, i.e. is fi xed on the market for different claims. It is on this market that the exchange of claims for cash takes place in such a way that an ʻequalisation of advantagesʼ takes place."
One reason for preferring the loanable funds theory is consequently that the rate of interest is fi xed on the capital market. However, Ohlin was well versed in general equilibrium theory. That the "rate of interest . . . is fi xed on the market for different claims" should therefore probably be interpreted in a dynamic sense. 77 The rate of change of the rate of interest is a positive function of the excess demand for loans. In spite of the equilibrium equivalence between the loanable funds and the liquidity prefer-ence theories, there is a further reason for preferring the former. The liquidity preference theory will evidently not function in the case of pure inside money. There is then no money market to be equilibrated by the rate of interest (or any other prices); see the discussion above about Wick sell and Sayʼs law.
Ohlinʼs (1937a) article was the fi rst in a triplet where Robertson (1937) and Hawtrey (1937) discussed Keynes 1937a . In his fi nal answer, Keynes (1937b) inter alia discussed Ohlin 1937a. Unfortunately, it seems that Keynes was not open to Ohlinʼs argument. Patinkin (1976, 139-40) has formulated it in the following way:
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Instead of undertaking the fruitful task . . . of applying Ohlinʼs ex ante/ex post analysis to the theory of effective demand and to its dynamic aspects in particular, Keynes devoted himself almost exclusively to its implications for the theory of liquidity preference-and in that context then began the pointless and depressing ʻliquidity-preference versus loanable fundsʼ debate that was to drag on in the literature for years. This debate-which Keynes also carried on with Robertson-stemmed largely from Keynesʼ failure to adopt the appropriate general equilibrium view of his own theory. 79 Coddington (1979, 977) suggests that Keynesʼs failure might be explained by the Marshallian tradition of partial equilibrium analysis.
The question of the equivalence of the liquidity preference theory and the loanable funds theory was discussed already in Hicksʼs 1936 review of Keynesʼs General Theory. In this paper and more systematically in Value and Capital, Hicks ([1939] 1946, 153-62) used Walrasʼs law to argue for the equivalence.
In a macroeconomic model with only two aggregate markets we would, via Walrasʼs law, expect equilibrium in one market (the capital market) to automatically imply equilibrium in the other (the aggregate goods market). Furthermore, if we know the notional excess demand function for the fi rst market, 80 we also know the functional form of the excess demand function for the second market. With several markets the case is not as Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 695 78. The quoted material does not include three footnotes that were in the original. 79. For surveys of the debate, see Johnson 1951-52; Shackle 1961 and 1967, 203-47; and Bridel 1987, 170-81. 80. Notional behavior equations presuppose Walrasian equilibrium in all markets. Effective behavior equations are derived subject to one or more rationing restrictions refl ecting rationing in one or more markets.
clear. If we add a money market where Sayʼs law does not hold (the excess demand function for money is not identically equal to zero), excess demand for loans (excess supply of loan instruments) could refl ect a combination of excess demand for money and excess demand for goods.
The argument is consequently not that the capital market is a refl ection of the money market. It is rather that we can eliminate one of the excess demand functions from a general equilibrium system. It does not matter if we eliminate the money market (we then get the loanable funds theory) or if we eliminate the capital market (we then get the liquidity preference theory). The rate of interest has to be derived within the framework of a general equilibrium system such as in Hicksʼs 1937 IS-LM analysis.
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In temporary equilibrium all prices in the economy infl uence the excess demand function of a certain market. In addition the equilibrium price vector is found by simultaneously solving all excess demand functions (see Patinkin [1956 Patinkin [ ] 1965 . This means that it is problematic to single out a few markets and study the equilibrium conditions for just these markets. From this point of view we cannot say that the rate of interest is a pure monetary phenomenon ("determined" in the money market) or a pure real phenomenon ("determined" in the "real" economy). As a by-product of their criticism of Wicksellʼs natural rate of interest, Myrdal and Palander discussed this question. Keynes (1937a, 245) concluded his interpretation of the loanable funds theory in the following way: "My contention [is] that the rate of interest (as we call it for short) is, strictly speaking, a monetary phenomenon in the special sense that it is the own-rate of interest (General Theory p. 223) on 81. However, in disequilibrium we could, for example, assume that the time derivative of a certain price is a positive function of the excess demand of the same market. The question of loanable funds versus liquidity preference consequently makes more sense for disequilibrium models. See, for example, Klein 1950a , Grossman 1971 , and Bibow 2000 . In spite of Ohlinʼs (1937a argument for preferring loanable funds for liquidity preference theory, disequilibrium theory does not unequivocally speak for one or the other. The reason is that the time derivative of a certain price may be a function of several excess demand functions (see Samuelson 1947, 274) . Excess demands in other markets can, via spillover effects, affect excess demand in the capital market (see Grossman 1971 and the discussion, in section 10 of this article, of temporary equilibrium with rationing). money itself, i.e. that it equalises the advantages of holding actual cash and deferred claim on cash."
Is the Rate of Interest a Monetary Phenomenon?
Keynesʼs argument for interpreting the rate of interest as a monetary phenomenon is different from the arguments of Myrdal (1931, 198-99) and Palander ([1941 Palander ([ ] 1953 , cited above. The arguments of Myrdal and Palander fi rst of all speak against the theoretical possibility of using Wickellʼs natural rate of interest in the analysis. Their fi rst argument concerned the aggregation problem. It is only in an economy with no more than one good or, alternatively, in stationary equilibrium that it is possible to defi ne the own rate of interest of the "real" economy. Otherwise a monetary measure is needed. Myrdal and to some extent Palander discussed these problems before macroeconomic models became standard practice.
The second argument of Myrdal 1931 and Palander 1941 is that it is impossible to ignore money when determining the natural rate of interest. The rate of interest is denominated in money. This is an argument that merely touches the surface of the problem.
Following Townshend 1937 , Robinson 1951 , and Kahn [1954 1972, one could instead argue that the demand for money is a function of the current in comparison with the expected rate of interest, the latter having no connection to thrift and productivity: "If the rate of interest is hanging by its own boot straps, so is the price of Picassoʼs paintings" (Robinson 1951, 103) . 82 Without taking the opposite extreme position and suggesting that money is "a veil," the following can be said. 83 We can assume that "the" rate of interest is both a "monetary" and a "real" phenomenon. In a small, aggregate, neoclassical four-market model with one labor, one good, one bond, and one money market, 84 we would expect that the rate of interest "operates simultaneously on the ʻthreefold marginʼ of time preference (consumption decisions), marginal productivity of capital (investment decisions) and liquidity preference (decisions as to the relative sizes of bond and money holdings)" (Patinkin [1956] 1965, Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 697 82. The allusion to "boot straps" refers to a discussion in Hicks [1939] 1946, 164, where Hicks concludes that "there must be more in it than that." The "more in it" presumably is (excluding fi nancial bubbles) that the expected rate of interest is related to the normal rate, the latter being determined by productivity and thrift (see Bridel 1987, 176) . In the same way, the expected future price of a Picasso painting may be infl uenced by the aesthetic quality of his works.
83. For a discussion of the history of the concept and an interpretation, see Patinkin and Steiger 1989. 84. As in Patinkin [1956] 1965, chapters 9-10. Note that Patinkin ([1956] 1965) assumed that supply and demand for labor do not depend on the rate of interest. If they were functions of the rate of interest, we would have one additional margin.
378-79).
A similar argument can be found in Robertson 1937, 431 (emphasis in original) : "The fact that the rate of interest measures the marginal convenience of holding idle money need not prevent it from measuring also the marginal inconvenience of abstaining from consumption."
However, the rate of interest could be seen as a "real" phenomenon if its long-run value were independent of monetary disturbances (see Patinkin [1956 Patinkin [ ] 1965 . For example, in a model with pure outside money and no distribution effects, a monetary disturbance would in the long run leave the real economy (including the rate of interest) unchanged and only affect the price level. Such long-run neutrality of money might be an argument for using an intertemporal model such as that of Wicksell 1893, with two goods and two factor markets, but without money. In this case the natural rate of money is determined within the "real" sector. 85 The properties of "the" rate of interest consequently depend on the choice of type of equilibrium model.
Different Equilibrium Models
Wicksell (1896, chap. 9B) analyzed cumulative processes as sequential clearing during the period of the factor and goods markets, respectively. Even if the natural rate differs from the loan rate of interest, there will be equilibrium in the nonfi nancial markets. But there will not be simultaneous equilibrium unless the two rates of interest are equal. 86 In contrast, Lindahl (1930) analyzed the cumulative process with the temporary equilibrium method. He consequently assumed that all markets clear simultaneously in the same period. Whereas Wicksell obtained 698 History of Political Economy 38:4 (2006) 85. On a more fundamental level, one might argue that it is diffi cult to distinguish between "real" and "monetary" phenomena. The reason is the following. The Walrasian general equilibrium model assumes frictionless markets with perfect competition. The principal function of money is to decrease market frictions (see Menger 1892; [1871 . From this perspective, the absence of frictions in a perfectly competitive exchange economy actually presupposes the existence of money. It is no coincidence that Walras in his successive expositions of the general equilibrium theory assumed money to be an integral part of the system (see Marget 1935) . For a discussion of Mengerʼs theory of the development of money, see OʼDriscoll 1986. From the early 1970s, interest in Mengerʼs theory of money has grown. Stenkula 2003 discusses Mengerʼs theory in the perspective of the network theory of money. For surveys of recent theory of the development of monetary exchange, see Ostroy and Starr 1990 and Alvarez 2004. 86. For an interpretation of Wicksellʼs analysis in terms of the IS-LM model at full employment, see Hicks 1937, 158. fi nite price movements during a certain period, Lindahlʼs assumption of simultaneous market clearing resulted in infi nite price changes. To get fi nite price changes, he assumed that wages are less fl exible than goods prices. The resulting change of the income distribution means that price level changes will restore equilibrium in the (consumer) goods market, even for the case of pure inside money. However, the nonequilibrating relative prices will probably result in a situation with quantity rationing in markets with effective excess supply or effective excess demand. There can still be temporary equilibrium, but it will now be equilibrium with rationing. 87 Let us assume that there is rationing in some markets due to fi xed nonmarket clearing prices. We further assume that the economy is characterized by temporary equilibrium, so that effective excess demand is zero for all markets. 88 An example of this is Keynesian unemployment equilibrium. Other examples are classical unemployment and general excess demand with repressed infl ation, respectively. For details, see Barro and Grossman 1976 and Malinvaud 1977 . Rationing in a market infl uences the behavior in other markets. Supply and demand curves will shift (spillover effects) and price elasticities will change (see Tobin and Houthakker 1950-51 and Tobin 1952) . This means that different fi xed price vectors lead to different temporary equilibria with rationing. The functional forms of the supply and demand functions in a certain market are in general different if we compare two of these temporary equilibrium situations. However, Walrasʼs law still holds under temporary equilibrium with rationing (see Barro and Grossman 1976, 58) . But now the sum of the monetary values of the effective excess demands should be zero.
Both prices and rationing restrictions may thus be involved in the equilibrium solution. If Lindahl (1930) had taken a further step and analyzed the consequences of assuming infl exible wage rates, his temporary equilibrium method would have been generalized to temporary equilibrium with rationing. However, one of the messages of Myrdalʼs analysis of monetary equilibrium is that we have to take the step into the realm of disequilibrium analysis. We discuss this question in the section below.
Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 699 87. The term temporary equilibrium thus means Walrasian temporary equilibrium. This is in contrast to temporary equilibrium with quantity rationing.
88. The notional supply and demand functions contain prices as arguments, whereas the effective supply and demand functions contain prices as well as rationing restrictions as arguments.
Disequilibrium Analysis
The question of equilibrium versus disequilibrium models permeated the discussion of monetary equilibrium.
Several of the interpreters of Wicksellʼs cumulative process have pointed out that it concerns phenomena outside equilibrium-for example, Hansson 1987, 736, and Iwai 1981, 4-5 . The exact meaning of the concept of disequilibrium was not defi ned by Hansson or by Iwai. Laidler (1972, 125) more specifi cally argued that Wicksell in his monetary theory analyzed trade at "non-equilibrium prices."
One might also defi ne equilibrium as the stronger requirement of zero excess demand in combination with fulfi llment of expectations. Here we need only assume that the expectations for the present period are fulfi lled. This was not the case in the chapter 9B, Interest and Prices version of Wicksellʼs cumulative process. Here factor markets are cleared before the goods market, but within the same period. Price expectations are wrong when factor prices are set. Brems (1986) used this defi nition and visualized the Wicksellian cumulative process as a succession of disequilibria. It depends of course on where exactly we draw the demarcation line between equilibrium and disequilibrium models. But if we do not require simultaneous clearing of all markets within the same period, we can visualize the cumulative process as a sequence of partial equilibria. Lindahl (1930) used the temporary equilibrium method in his monetary analysis. The assumption of general equilibrium for the fi rst period precludes the occurrence of a gap between the natural and the loan rate of interest. In temporary equilibrium, the loan rate of interest is always normal. Myrdal (1931) was very critical of Lindahlʼs (1930) method of temporary equilibrium. His main objection was that the assumption of coordination in the beginning of each period and market trading at fi xed prices in the remaining part of the period was unrealistic. Myrdal consequently argued for disequilibrium analysis. This means that the actions and the expectations of the agents are not coordinated via prices and rationing restrictions. People will experience surprises during the period. The ex ante values will consequently differ from the ex post values.
Even if Myrdal 1933 and 1939 do contain some discussion of how a discrepancy between investments and saving ex ante is resolved into equality ex post, one cannot say that Myrdal succeeded in performing disequilibrium analysis. Johansson 1934 contains a nontheoretical discussion of special cases (see Hansen 1981) . Lundberg 1937 represents an attempt to formulate model sequences suitable for dynamic analysis. Chapter 8 is of special interest (see Siven 1985) . Svennilson 1938 gives an outline of the microeconomic underpinning necessary to build disequilibrium models (see Siven 1991) . However, he did not derive behavior equations. His analysis stopped at a principles stage.
In comparison to the various attempts to formulate dynamic theory referred to above, the fi rst part of Lindahl 1939 contains a more systematic treatment. In "Introduction to the Study of Dynamic Theory" in that work, he outlined how dynamic analysis both of individual behavior (the general theory of planning, Lindahl 1939, 40-51) and market outcomes (the general theory of development, Lindahl 1939, 51-60) in principle should be developed. 89 This microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis could be performed by either assuming equilibrium or disequilibrium. 90 In both cases Lindahl used period analysis, the argument being that prices are not changed continuously.
When comparing the usefulness of the equilibrium and the disequilibrium methods, Lindahl (1939, 68-69) pointed out that the disequilibrium method was the more general one. The temporary equilibrium method assumes "an abrupt transition from one such equilibrium position to another" (69). Lindahl also pointed at the strategic role played by expectations in monetary equilibrium. Incompatible expectations lead to revisions in the beginning of each period. Consequently the dynamic development under temporary equilibrium is driven by changed expectations. However, in order for expectations to be taken seriously, they have to be explicitly accounted for, which will complicate the theory. Still, equilibrium theory does not have to use the "cumbersome ex ante and ex post terminology" (68). Moreover, the temporary equilibrium method without explicit analysis of anticipations regarding future periods may be useful when analyzing the main lines of development. Lindahl (1939) consequently discussed the pros and cons of disequilibrium analysis. The starting point for Myrdalʼs plea for disequilibrium analysis was a criticism of Lindahlʼs (1930) use of the temporary equilibrium method. Lindahl of 1939 acknowledged the disequilibrium method as the more realistic one, but pointed at its costs in the form of greater analytical complexity.
Siven / Monetary Equilibrium 701 89. A version of Lindahlʼs discussion existed already in 1934 (see Steiger 1971) . 90. Lindahl (1939, 64-68) distinguished between two equilibrium methods. The fi rst was partial temporary equilibrium, the second general (multimarket) temporary equilibrium. Wicksellʼs analysis in Interest and Prices, chapter 9, section B, uses an equilibrium concept of the fi rst type.
The question of whether the Stockholm school anticipated (or even surpassed) the analysis of Keynesʼs General Theory is connected to the question of whether the Swedish economists performed disequilibrium analysis or not. One of the reasons why Keynes did and the Stockholm school did not form the starting point for the development of macroeconomics during the coming decades was that Keynes formulated an equilibrium model. The Stockholm economists generally lacked the appropriate analytical methods to perform disequilibrium analysis. Disequilibrium analysis of the Stockholm type thus usually turned into analysis of special cases. The general principles were not easy to distinguish. In contrast, the clear structure and the easy comprehension of the interdependencies of equilibrium models worked in favor of the Keynesians.
Conclusion
The problem of monetary equilibrium was on the agenda in Sweden for over fifty years, from Wicksellʼs ( When Wicksell chose to analyze the case of pure inside money, he could no longer work with equilibrium in terms of quantities (supply of and demand for money), but had to use prices (the natural and the loan rate of interest). Wicksellʼs formulation of monetary theory raised two important controversies during his lifetime, the fi rst with David Davidson, the second with Gustav Åkerman (see Siven 1998) . Neither controversy ended with a clear conclusion. Furthermore, Wicksell was constantly ready to revise his theory. He never reached a conclusion that he himself considered fi nal.
When Lindahl during the 1920s took a fresh look at monetary theory, his starting point was Wicksellʼs approach. However, he based his monetary theory on another equilibrium concept than that of Wicksell. Lindahlʼs assumption of temporary equilibrium eliminated the possibility of a gap between the two interest rates. When Myrdal argued against Lindahlʼs analysis, he consequently chose to criticize the use of the temporary equilibrium method. Myrdalʼs discussion was rich in ideas. It was also quite infl uential; the members of the Stockholm school to a large extent analyzed economic processes in time, not equilibrium positions. However, the Swedish economists were not ready to make the necessary analytical simplifi cations. Their results therefore too often consisted of special cases, which were diffi cult to draw general conclusions from. Palanderʼs criticism indicated a number of directions for further analytical development of the period analysis of the Stockholm school.
The discussion of monetary equilibrium on the whole took place within a small closed system. The Swedish economists based their analysis on Wicksellʼs monetary theory. They mainly wrote in Swedish. Exports and imports of ideas were of minor signifi cance. This makes it comparatively easy to follow the development of the Swedish analysis of monetary equilibrium and to see the interactions between the participating economists. The small system also implied a certain unity in the views of Swedish economists. For example, they were all (with Wicksell himself and perhaps Hammarskjöld [1933] as exceptions) critical of the quantity theory of money. Their critical attitude also implied that they preferred loanable funds to liquidity preference when analyzing interest rate determination. In consequence, the Swedes did not interpret the concept of monetary equilibrium as equilibrium in the money market, but as a more general macroeconomic equilibrium.
